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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1951 TERM
Plaintiff's intestate was found by village officials on the floor
of the village firehouse, apparently incoherent and suffering from
the cold. They placed him in the jail, where he did not receive
medical attention for eighteen hours. He died of pneumonia
several days later, with a broken arm and hip given as the direct
cause. Plaintiff brought a death action.3 9
It is a well settled principle in New York that where there
are several causes contributing to injury, the injury may be attrib-
uted to any or all of those causes.40 The question is whether or
not the defendant's acts or omissions substantia ly contributed
to the injury.41 This effectively disposes of the argument that
because the broken arm and hip could have caused the death, the
defendant is absolved from liability. The mere fact that the death
might have resulted from another cause is insufficient.42 In short,
plaintiff is not required to eliminate by his proof all other possible
causes. The question of what constitutes a substantial factor is
here a jury question.
It becomes clear that this case merely fits the facts to the
existing rules, neither adding to nor substracting from them.
Indemnity
There is no indemnity43 between joint tortfeasors as a
general rule.44. In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis.
This rule is not without exceptions. Among the many are: (1)
The rule does not apply and there may be recovery where one
party was only technically or constructively at fault and the negli-
gent act of -the party from whom indemnity is sought was the
primary cause of the injury.45 (2) The rule does not apply where
both parties were at fault, but not in the same fault toward the
person injured and the fault of the party against whom indemnity
is claimed was the primary and efficient cause of the injury
39. DEMENT ESTATE LAW §130.
40. Foley v. State of New York, 294 N. Y. 275, 280, 62 N. E. 2d 69, 71 (1945) ; see
also, RSTATnmT, ToRTs § 879.
41. Cornbrooks v. Terminal Barber Shops, 282 N. Y. 217, 223, 26 N. E. 2d
25. 27 (1940).
42. Ingersoll v'. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N. Y. 1, 7, 14 N. E. 2d 828, 830(1938).
43. There is an important distinction between indemnity, which shifts -the entire
loss, and contribution, which distributes the loss among the tortfeasors. " Paossmp,
ToRTs 1117 (1941). For contribution among joint tortfeasors in New York see C. P. A.
§211-a.
44. Wineck v. Yanoff, 265 App. Div. 835, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 563 (1942).
45. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Capital City Surety Co., 244 App. Div. 500,
231 N. Y. Supp. 169 (1928).
46. Colonial Motor Coach Corp. v. New York Cent. R., 131 Misc. 891, 228
X. Y. Supp. 508 (Sup. Ct. 1928); General Accident, Fire & Life "Assur. Corp. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 132 F. 2d 122 (2d Cir. 1942).
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(3) Where the party seeking indemnity was guilty of passive
negligence as distinguished from the other's active negligence.47
The right of indemnification between joint tortfeasors pre-
supposes that the injured person has a cause of action against
both. The right also depends upon the difference in the character
of the wrong and not on comparative negligence. As betweenjoint tortfeasors, the obligation to indemnify is not a consensual
one; it is based altogether upon the law's notion-influened by an
equitable background--of what is fair and proper between the
parties. 4 The quasi-contractual idea of unjust enrichment, of
course, underlies any holding that one who has been compelled in
discharging his own legal obligation to pay a claim which in fair-
ness and good conscience should be paid by another, can secure
reimbursement from the other.49
In an action by a longshoreman against the charterer of a vessel,
a booking agent of the charterer, a manufacturer and shipper of
carbon tetrachloride, and the purchaser of that chemical, the plain-
tiff recovered for injuries sustained when he was overcome by
fumes from the chemical in a poorly ventilated hold of the ship.
The Court held in AicFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge:5 0 (I) The
charterer was entitled to indemnity in a third-party action against
the plaintiff's employer and the manufacturer-shipper. (2) The
manufacturer-shipper was not entitled to indemnity from the
plaintiff's employer.
The jury found that the primary cause of the injury to the
plaintiff was the combined negligence of the defendant manufac-
turer-shipper and the plaintiff's employer. This is evident from
the fact that the jury. awarded indemnity to the charterer against
both the manufacturer-shipper and the employer. Let us examine
the nature of the negligence of each of the three parties involved
in the indemnity actions.
First, the manufacturer-shipper. The fact that forty-three
out of the one hundred ten drums shipped were found to have de-
veloped leaks is sufficient evidence from which a jury mgiht infer
that the druns were inadequate for the purpose intended. Even
47. Scott v. Curtis, 195 N. Y. 424, 88 N. E. 794 (1909); Trustees of Village of
Geneva v. Brush Electric Co., 50 Hun 581, 3 N. Y. Supp. 595 (5th Dep't 1889). For
other exceptions to the general rule see PgossmE, TORTS 1114-1116 (1941).
48. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
130, 147 (1932).
49. KEEnEa, QUASI-CONTRACTS 408; WOODWARD, QUAsi-CoNmACTS 396.
50. 304 N. Y. 314, 107 N. E. 2d 463 (1952).
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though the drums were roughly handled by another, the negligence
of the shipper was active, although concurrent.
Second, the plaintiff's employer. There is sufficient evidence
of this party's active negligence in roughly handling the drums.
Of course, it is also the employer's duty to provide a safe place to
work and warn employees of any dangers."
Third, the charterer. Maritime law and not state law must
be applied.52 A longshoreman engaged to load a ship is entftled to
a reasonably safe place to work.5 3 The owner has a duty to warn
longshoremen of hidden dangers. 4 This duty cannot be dele-
gated,55 and the fact the longshoremen's employer owed him the
same duty is of no consequence; the duty is concurrent.5 6 Here,
if the drums had not been inadequate or handled roughly the acci-
dent would not have occurred even though the drums were stored
in the poorly ventilated hold. In short, for the charterer to be
actively negligent, there must be a showing that he knew the drums
were leaking when they were stored, or it must be shown that the
act as to the plaintiff had possibilities of danger so many and ap-
parent as to entitle him to be protected against its commission.
5 7
The mere act of storage is not pregnant with those dangers. The
fact that the jury returned a verdict for the charterer against the
manufacturer-shipper and employer implies that the charterer had
no knowledge of the leak. The charterer's negligence may be
characterized as one of omission-failure to provide a safe place
to work, the failure to warn of the properties of the chemical.
The fact that both the employer and the charterer owed the
same duty to provide a safe place to work for plaintiff does not
necessarily mean they are in part delicto.5 . The primary duty
rests on the employer. 9
51. Porello v. United States, 153 F. 2d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 1946), rev!d in Part and
aff'd in part sub nom, American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446 (1947).
52. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920).
53. Fodera v. Booth Amer. Shipping Corp., 66 F. Supp. 319 (S. D. N. Y. 1946),
aff'd, 159 F. 2d 795 (2d Cir. 1947).
54. Ibid.
55. Sciolaro v. Asch, 198 N. Y. 77, 91 N. E. 263 (1910).
56. Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160 F. 2d 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
57. Palsgraf v. Long Island R., 248 N. Y. 339, 345, 162 N. E. 99, 101 (1928).
58. Tipaldi v. Riverside Memorial Chapel, 273 App. Div. 414, 418, 78 N. Y. S. 2d
12, 17 (1st Dep't 1948) af'd, 298 N. Y. 686, 82 N. E. 2d 585 (1948).
59. Supra n. 51.
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Thus, as outlined, the charterer's negligence consisted of non-
feasance, while that of both the employer and the manufacturer-
shipper consisted of misfeasance--one an omission, the others a
commission; one passive, the others active. The conclusion, there-
fore, that the tortfeasor passively negligent may be indemnified by
the active tortfeasors, and the active tortfeasors may not be indem-
nified as between themselves, is in harmony with the settled princi-
ples of joint torts.
B. Intentional Torts
Right of Privacy
The law of torts provides protection to an individual's
person and property. The development of the law to afford
principles to protect an individual's intangible rights in his
person is evidence of the growth and flexibility of the commonlaw.6 0  The right to be "let alone"'" or the right to privacy was
discussed in a legal periodical before the courts took cognizance
of the right."" In New York a common law right to privacy is not
recognized.6 3. The only remedy in New York is conferred by a
statute which confined redress to the appropriation of some ele-
ment of the plaintiff's personality for commercial use. 4 Even
thus limited, the statute has received a narrow construction from
the courts in interpreting what is a use for "advertising pur-
poses" or 'purposes of trade. 6 a5  The use of a name or picture in
a newspaper, magazine, or newsreel in connection with an item of
news or of general public interest is not a use for purposes of
trade.66
60. E.g., some courts have recognized the intentional causing of mental dis-
turbance as a tort. Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 198 P. 2d 696 (1948).
61. Coo=.EY, ToiRs 29 (2d ed. 1888).
62. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. RTv. 193 (1890).
63. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902);
Rhodes v. Sperry Hutchinson Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097 (1908).
64. N. Y. Civu. RIGHTs LAw §§ 50-51: "Any person whose name, portrait or
picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade . . .
may sue and recover damages . . ." (Italics added)
65. Maloney v. Boy Comics, 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 119 (1st Dep't 1950).
see Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MIcH. L. REv. 526 (1941).
66. Sidis v. F-R Publication Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Humiston v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752 (1st Dep't 1919);
Coyler v. Fox Publishing Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. Supp. 999 (2d Dep't 1914) ;
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N. Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937). But the
right of privacy was held violated where an individual not in public life was unduly
singled out in a newsreel, Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N. Y.
Supp. 800 (1st Dept 1932), affd, 261 N. Y. 504, 185 N. E. 713 (1933), and a public
figure's news value was used for purely commercialization in Redmond v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 277 N. Y. 707, 14 N. E. 2d 636 (1938),; Franklin v. Columbia Pictures
Corp., 246 App. Div. 35, 284 N. Y. Supp. 96 (1st Dept 1935), affd, 271 N. Y 554, 2
N. E. 2d 691 (1936). See 1 BrwF. L. Ray. 174 (1951).
